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FEBRUARY 1955

MONTHLY REVIEW

INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

A JUST AND SECURE PEACE

THE EDITORS

COMMON SENSE ON THE SOVIET UNION

WILLIAM MANDEL

CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS

POLITICAL ECONOMIST

VOL. 6

10

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Leo Huberman is tentatively planning a speaking tour to the West Coast in late March and early April for the purpose of renewing contacts with MR readers, getting new subscribers, and raising money for the magazine. Neither itinerary nor schedule of meetings has yet been drawn up, and we would like to hear from you before going any further with the planning. If you can hold a meeting in your community or on your campus, let us know right away. We would like to fit in as many stopovers and meetings as possible.

Attorney General Wyman of New Hampshire has filed a report on his investigation of so-called subversive activities with the 1955 session of the State Legislature. The findings as reported in the press—for example that from the beginning there have been some 130 members of the Communist Party in New Hampshire, and that four educators residing in the state including one MR editor have belonged to organizations cited by somebody or other as subversive—seem hardly worth the \$30,000 they cost the State's taxpayers. Nevertheless, the first law passed by the new Legislature was to extend the hunt for three months, while a law extending it for two more

(continued on inside back cover)

A JUST AND SECURE PEACE

"We must be willing," President Eisenhower said in his State of the Union message to the 84th Congress, "to use the processes of negotiation whenever they will advance the cause of just and secure peace."

Fine, Mr. President. But what is a just and secure peace? You must have some idea of what you mean by the phrase. Either that or you are talking hypocritical nonsense, which, if only because of our respect for the high office you hold, we are unwilling to believe. But you carefully avoid telling us what you and your administration think a just and secure peace would be.

Why? If the American people must spend \$30 to \$40 billion a year on armaments, if our youth must sacrifice the best years of their lives to military service, if we are to forego our traditional freedoms and live under the conditions of a garrison state—if all these things are, as you apparently think, necessary, are we not entitled to be told in clear and simple terms what their purpose is?

Let us put aside vague generalities about justice and freedom. They do not answer the question. Everyone has his own ideas about justice and freedom, and you and the leaders of the Soviet bloc—with whom, after all, you must make peace if there is to be peace—could argue till doomsday without ever coming to a meeting of minds. Or do you perhaps mean by talking in terms of justice and freedom—and your State of the Union message is studded with the two terms—that your idea of a just and secure peace is one in which *your* ideas of justice and freedom are imposed on the Soviet bloc?

If so, please say so. It would at least clarify matters, for this particular abstraction is easy to translate into concrete terms. To impose your ideas of justice and freedom on the Soviet bloc would mean imposing your social and economic system on the Soviet bloc. You surely would not deny it, since Communism, in your view, is a social order in which "man is a soulless, animated machine to be enslaved, used and consumed by the state for its own glorification," and surely there could be no justice or freedom under such a system. But, equally surely, you can be under no illusions about the fact that the leaders of the Soviet bloc do not agree with this estimate of their system, that they regard *your* social system as one of brutal and

heartless exploitation, and that they would lead their nations in a fight to the death rather than accept a return of capitalism?

Let us, then, put a simple question: Do you mean by a just and secure peace the imposition of capitalism on the Soviet bloc? If the answer is yes, that ends the matter. *But let us be perfectly clear that it leaves absolutely nothing to negotiate about.* The people of the United States, and of countries allied to the United States, are surely entitled to know if this is the real state of affairs. Knowing, they could face up realistically to the alternatives: put in power people with a different idea of a just and secure peace, or prepare themselves materially and spiritually for war, cold or hot or both, to the end.

But let us assume that you mean what you say about wanting to negotiate, or in other words that your idea of a just and secure peace is compatible with the carrying on in good faith of negotiations with the leaders of the Soviet bloc. What kind of a peace would that be?

What, indeed, if not a peace based on the principle of the co-existence of the two systems? Coexistence, you say, is a Communist-inspired word and you don't like it? Very well, let us use an expression of your own, *modus vivendi*, a way of living together. Is that what we are after? And if so, is there any hope of getting it?

Here again, we must attempt to translate abstractions into concrete terms. What would a *modus vivendi* imply?

No one could draw up a complete blueprint at this time, but fortunately there is no need to. A *modus vivendi* can, indeed must, be worked out step by step. The point is to understand what the first step has to be, and to take it. Can there be any doubt, Mr. President?

The first step must be a frank recognition by everyone concerned of the actual state of the world, and the drafting of certain ground rules for future international conduct. And these tasks fortunately do not pose very complicated or difficult problems.

Regimes that are solidly in power must be universally recognized, and their territorial limits demarcated and guaranteed.

Each major power that insists on a special sphere of influence or security zone for itself must grant the same right to others, and the boundaries of these spheres or zones must be agreed to. (Every big nation, in other words, has a right to its own Monroe Doctrine.)

All major powers must agree to keep hands off regions that fall outside the agreed-upon security zones.

We think, Mr. President, that if you give the matter some thought, you will agree that the negotiation of a general treaty between the Big Four or Big Five along these lines would put an end to the most dangerous disputes that are now plaguing the world and threatening to erupt into new wars, little or big.

Would the Soviet bloc agree to enter negotiations for such a general agreement as the first step in working out a *modus vivendi*?

Probably the best-informed, and certainly one of the most intelligent, of Washington newspapermen believes that it would, that it has been willing ever since the cold war started. We quote from James Reston, writing in the *New York Times* of January 3rd, 1955: "Ever since James F. Byrnes was Secretary of State in 1946 Moscow has been willing to negotiate a spheres-of-influence deal with the Western powers." And why have successive United States governments refused? Because they were afraid that the Soviet Union would insist on gobbling up new areas? Not at all, according to Mr. Reston, who writes that, "The United States opposed that then and the administration opposes it now on the ground that it is not prepared to sanction—or even seem to sanction—the Soviet postwar territorial gains."

The United States has its Monroe Doctrine, Mr. President, and neither the Soviet Union nor China has ever challenged it. But when the Soviet Union, which in contrast to the United States has been the object of repeated military invasions throughout its short history, gains a small amount of territory and a larger number of allies as a result of a war which the USSR did not start but which cost it the lives of some twenty million of its best sons and daughters—when that happens, the United States is outraged, puts its foot down, "is not prepared to sanction."

Does it really make sense, Mr. President? Can we take you seriously when you talk about a *modus vivendi* and say you are anxious to negotiate?

Or must we conclude that your idea of a just and secure peace is, after all, to impose the capitalist system on the Soviet bloc?

For the American people, indeed for the whole world, these are life-and-death questions. Don't you think you owe us one more message in which you give us your answer?

THE BIG AND DANGEROUS GAME

German rearmament is not yet in the bag.

Legally, the situation is that the ratification of the Paris agreements which French Premier Mendès-France managed to wring out of the National Assembly in the last days of December must now be submitted for review and advice to the French Senate (*Conseil d'Etat*). There, the issue will be resolved in one of three possible ways:

- (1) The Senate can concur, in which case final French ap-

proval would be a pure formality.

(2) The Senate can vote the agreements down, which would mean a reconsideration by the Assembly. In view of the composition of the Senate, where the Right is stronger than in the Assembly and where the Communists have only a handful of representatives, this seems most unlikely to happen.

(3) The Senate might make changes, even quite small changes, in the text of the bill passed by the Assembly. This, too, would have the effect of throwing the whole matter back into the lap of the Assembly for a second reading. In view of the reluctance of all French politicians to take the ultimate responsibility for German rearmament, this would seem to be a not unattractive or unlikely "out" for the French Senators: without taking any position on the central issue, they could in this way pass the buck back to the Assembly where it would have to be finally settled one way or the other.

Of course, it is possible that the Assembly would once again vote as it did on December 30th, in favor of German rearmament. But this is far from certain. The campaign against ratification at the grass-roots level is gaining momentum. The December voting showed that between early October and the end of the year, a clear majority in favor of the London accords had dwindled to a minority in favor of German rearmament.* He would indeed be rash who would assert that the evolution of either public opinion or the political balance on this issue has come to an end. In another couple of months, it is quite possible that there will be a clear majority *against* German rearmament.

Let us hope so, and that this new majority will have the opportunity to express itself. Not only would France be saving its own soul; it would also be saving the whole West from the blind folly or the incredible stupidity—or is it both?—of its supposedly wisest statesmen and soldiers.

But for the present, at least, we must not assume any such providential outcome of the German rearmament question. The duty of everyone who understands what is at stake is to attempt to clarify the real issues while there is still time.

From 1933 to 1939, the Western powers, with Britain in the lead but with numerous assists from Washington, encouraged German rearmament in the obvious hope and expectation that Germany would move eastward and liquidate the "Bolshevist menace." In pursuing this brilliant strategy, they even went so far as to help Hitler and Mussolini to conquer Spain, right in their own front yard.

What was the outcome?

* The vote in favor of the London accords on October 12th was 350 to 113; that in favor of German rearmament on December 30th was 287 to 260. The total membership of the Assembly is 627.

The Soviet Union, alias the Bolshevik menace, having long urged a policy of collective security to check and contain German expansionism, finally recognized that the Western powers were invincibly blind to their own real, long-run interests. The Soviet Union therefore took the only course open to it—other than sitting and waiting to be attacked by a united capitalist world. It made a deal with Nazi Germany which sent the Wehrmacht westward rather than eastward.

Ever since the decision in 1948 to form an independent West German state, the Western powers have been repeating their German policy of the 30s, though of course in a different context and by different methods. Unite the capitalist world behind a spearhead of West German power and force the boundaries of the socialist world back either by threats or by actual armed attack: such has been the essence of Western policy.

So far, the Soviet response has also followed the same lines as in the period before 1939: let us make an agreement, the Soviets have, in effect, said to the Western powers, to keep Germany from arising again as a military power, and thus let us check a renewed German expansionism before it ever gets under way. So long as Germany remains unarmed, this is almost certain to remain Soviet policy, for the very simple reason that it accords with Soviet interests.

But if Germany is rearmed, the Soviet Union can only conclude that its policy of seeking agreement to contain German expansionism has failed, and past experience suggests that when a policy fails the Soviet leaders abandon it and try something else (would that the same could be said of American leaders!). What is that “something else” likely to be? What, indeed, if not seeking a direct agreement with West Germany, with a view to disrupting the capitalist front and encouraging German expansionism to move westward rather than eastward? In essence, this is precisely what the Soviet leaders did in 1939, and it is so obviously their second-best bet today that there is no excuse for anyone to have the slightest illusion on this score.

The only serious question is whether West Germany is likely to play ball with the Soviet Union, or whether it is likely to remain a faithful junior partner of the Washington-London tandem. But can there be any real doubt about the answer to this question?

The national interests of Germany, as conceived by the West German ruling class, are, obviously, (1) to achieve the reunification of the country on the best attainable terms from a capitalist point of view, and (2) to achieve the maximum possible expansion of foreign markets for German goods and foreign outlets for German capital.

The alliance with Washington and London cannot help West Germany to pursue either of these aims. On the contrary. The Soviet Union is certainly never going to agree to the reunification of Ger-

many on terms acceptable to Messrs. Dulles and Eden: the apparently widespread belief to the contrary is one of the most remarkable, because least founded, delusions of our time. Germany can be unified only through negotiations with the Soviet Union and on terms acceptable to the Soviet Union. That is the first reason why West Germany is likely to play ball with the Soviet Union, once it has got from the Western powers what is in their power to grant, namely, sovereignty and rearmament.

The second reason is that German imperialist interests are in conflict with those of Britain and the United States, and in order to get the most out of the situation the West German capitalists need freedom of action and the ability to play the two great power centers off against each other. By pursuing such a course, they can hope for concessions from both sides.

Once Germany is rearmed, in short, it is clear that every consideration of national interest, as conceived by those in power in the Soviet Union and West Germany respectively, will drive the two countries into negotiations. And the result, whether or not they soon succeed in reaching a clear-cut agreement on the reunification of Germany and other questions, cannot but be an entirely new European balance of power. In the region from the Elbe to the Atlantic, West Germany will inevitably become top dog, achieving by diplomacy what Hitler achieved by force.

There are doubtless those who think that West Germany (or possibly a reunified Germany), having gained the mastery of Western Europe, will then turn eastward, thus after all vindicating the Dulles-Eden strategy. Perhaps. But it would be extraordinarily risky, not to say stupid, to count on it. Turning eastward was Hitler's fatal error, and the West German ruling class has every reason to know it and no reason to forget it. Moreover, if the USSR was a tough military nut to crack fifteen years ago, how much tougher it will be, allied with Eastern Europe and most of Asia, five or ten years hence! A more attractive and profitable policy for Germany is likely to be to protect its rear by a deal with the USSR and, at the expense of both the United States and Britain, to continue its expansion overseas by exploiting Anglo-American differences.

That such a policy might lead to war goes without saying. A remilitarized Germany, in possession, as it certainly will be sooner or later, of A- and H-bombs, will be an ever-present menace to *everyone*. Today's *imaginary* danger of Soviet aggression will be replaced by the *very real and immediate* danger of German aggression. And it goes without saying that a war once started, whatever its source or point of origin, may well engulf the whole planet.

Nevertheless, if our analysis is sound, we cannot avoid the con-

clusion that of all the countries in the world, those least likely to be involved in the initial stages of a war let loose by a resurgent Germany, and those with the best chance of escaping it altogether, are the socialist countries.

This is why the Soviet Union will almost certainly seek a deal with West Germany, once that country is rearmed. It is also the correct measure of the wisdom of Western statesmanship in insisting on the re-creation of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe.

At the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow in the spring of 1939, less than half a year before the outbreak of World War II, Stalin issued a solemn warning to the Western world. We have quoted it before, and we quote it again:

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention [in Spain], to talk of treason, treachery, and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.

Truer words were never spoken. With a few minor changes they are as applicable to the situation today as they were sixteen years ago. They should be indelibly stamped on the mind of every champion of German rearmament.

(January 15, 1955)

COMMON SENSE ON THE SOVIET UNION

BY WILLIAM MANDEL

In the American Communist theoretical publication *Political Affairs* for November 1954, Tim Buck, the leading Canadian Communist, writes about the people of the USSR: "Their personal ambitions and *the methods by which they seek to achieve them*, reflect already the fact that there is no capitalist class in the Soviet Union." And again: "When they directly and naturally identify themselves completely with the achievements of the collective, see its gains as gains for themselves, and *have no thought of gain excepting as part of the collective*, they are indeed people of a new type—socialist

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people." (Emphasis added.)

In *Masses & Mainstream* for the same month, however, Joe Clark writes that "the Soviet press prints articles and letters criticizing certain executives for advancing not on the basis of merit but on pull or intrigue." To be more explicit, the Soviet press in recent months has carried, among many similar stories, the following examples of non-socialist behavior and methods of achieving ambitions and acquiring gain:

A son turning his mother out of her house because she refuses to deed it to him; juvenile delinquency to the point of murder of a grade-school pupil by his fellows, knifing, drunkenness in a fifth-grader, and *protection of these delinquents by their highly-placed parents*; a rise in alcoholism among working youth; feudal kidnapping of mountain women into marriage with the connivance of local *Party members* and police; a woman judge permitting her husband to tear up their daughter's books on the ground that 13 is the age at which an Uzbek girl ought to marry; *kickbacks* by workers under threat of losing their jobs; open black-marketing on the premises of department stores; officials corraling housing for themselves; police drunk and asleep at their posts, and police taken off duty to escort the chief's wife to a vacation resort; dusty streets left unsprinkled while sprinklers are used for the private gardens of various officials; *graft*, plain and fancy; refusal of work assignments away from the big cities, and successful use of family connections and friendship to change such assignments; widespread reprisals against persons exposing these and other misdeeds and shortcomings, and also against scientific opponents; buck-passing for fear of assuming responsibility; and ordinary murder in connection with robbery, rape, and other criminal acts.*

The Soviet press is not sensationalist. It is a highly responsible, Party press. It has never published items of this type as news for its own sake, or when such happenings are unique. It deals with them only when they are sufficiently widespread to make it necessary to call upon the Party, the Young Communist League, the unions, and the people at large to deal with them, and when it believes that circumstances make it possible to deal with them. Their publication is

* These items must be seen within the following framework, relative to the major points dealt with above: the home-owner's house is his, not a mortgage company's; there is no narcotics addiction; 40% of Soviet judges are women (Moslem areas included), there are more women doctors by far than the whole medical profession in the United States, and more women engineers than in the rest of the world combined; with jobs for all, the only question is who gets or holds the best or easiest; seven straight years of state price cuts have slashed black market prices accordingly; police brutality is absolutely unheard-of, whatever top-level MVD investigators may have done; as industry is publicly-owned, 5-percenters are unnecessary and non-existent, and the level of graft is individual, not industrial; crime trends steadily downward.

part of the process of dealing with contradictions in Soviet society—both contradictions arising from the struggle of the present with the past, and those arising from the struggle of the future with the present.

The American press publicizes such items, gloats over them, and treats them as static, permanent aspects of Soviet life. *Political Affairs* and similar publications do no service to the cause of understanding and peaceful coexistence when they ignore such items or brush them once over lightly, leaving their readers helpless to deal with the self-serving interpretations of the cold-war press.

Tim Buck's article is an excellent case in point. When he reports vast progress, and ascribes it to socialism, it is one thing. But when he generalizes, and attributes to the Soviet Union achievements, material and otherwise, that have been impossible of attainment thus far, it is quite another. Let us examine in detail some of the errors of fact and emphasis in his article.

On page 24, Buck writes of "the extensive cultured enjoyment of life which distinguishes the Soviet Union from capitalist countries." But his figure on theaters which follows is dozens of times exaggerated, and can only be assumed to be the figure on amateur theatrical groups entered in the national elimination contests, to which it is statistically approximate. More important, however, as a glance at the Five Year Plan figures will show, is that the vast majority of Soviet people do not have radios or even wired receivers as yet, and that far more Americans hear classical music much more often (despite the preponderance of musical trash on the airwaves) than do Soviet people, simply because live audiences cannot be and are not as large as home audiences.* Six times as many American homes have radio sets and the national advertisers use opera stars and serious instrumentalists quite often.

Likewise, *Life* magazine, with all its filth and advertising, has brought reproductions of the classics of painting into many more American homes than has *Ogonek* and other publications into Soviet homes. A single look at the relative circulation figures (*Life*, 5,300,000; *Ogonek*, 650,000) makes that clear. The majority of Soviet citizens live long distances from art museums.

Thanks to television—probably the most misused medium of all—tens of millions of Americans (we have over 30 million sets)

* Ten thousand concerts are scheduled throughout the USSR this season (*Sovetskaya Kultura*, October 2, 1954). That means a live audience of about five million—or less than the audience for a single coast-to-coast broadcast of a concert. Another way of putting it is that not more than one Soviet adult in 30 will be able to get into a concert hall this year. It is clear that only a tiny minority of the Soviet people—as of the American—ever hear music by performers of professional caliber except by radio, which most of us have and five-sixths of them don't.

have seen ballet; and the movies here, decadent and vile as they often are, have also recently popularized this art form. Movie attendance in the Soviet Union is smaller than here, because of fewer facilities, both in town and village; and television is non-existent outside a few major cities (only one-thirtieth as many Soviet people have sets). Again, the number in the Soviet Union who have seen ballet in the flesh, despite their vastly larger number of companies, is only a fraction of those reached by a single network broadcast here. The same holds for opera, and for such classics of the theater as the American people have been permitted to see: primarily Shakespeare.

Only in the field of book-length literature has the Soviet Union been able to produce enough copies to make this form of art and knowledge available to all the people. But it has not yet been able to educate all the people to be able to read books. With a population one-third larger than ours, the Soviet Union has, this year, only three-quarters as many high school students as we, and that represents a recent and tremendous stride forward. The average schooling of the entire adult population is substantially less than seven years. It was 1949 before facilities were available to make seven-year-schooling compulsory. It is an exceptional person who is able to cope with the vocabulary of any masterpiece of literature or political science with only an elementary school education.*

"Extensive cultured enjoyment of life" requires the conditions—subjective in terms of education, objective in terms of the facilities for the communication of culture—of enjoyment, and the Soviet Union has not yet been able to close the gap created by our head-start, our enrichment in two wars while most of the world suffered devastation of cultural facilities and interruption in education in those same wars.

In view of the six-to-one disparity in homes equipped with radios, and the thirty-to-one disparity in television sets, the statement on page 25 that "there is no scarcity of such products today" is simply ridiculous. That holds equally for "electric sewing machines" which the author brackets in the same category. The full-paragraph discussion of private automobiles is even less realistic in tone, for there are about a hundred private cars in this country to every one in the USSR, and the disparity in output is not much smaller.

To move on to the economy. On page 26, Soviet steel production is described as "considerably more than 50 percent" of our own. Perhaps the author assumed that United States production would

* Even in the Party *one-third of the membership* has less than seven years' schooling, according to an official report last fall. This is the most advanced section of the people. Progress, however, is rapid. In 1939, the figure was two-thirds. That's why Stalin wrote so simply.

not lift above its crisis level at the beginning of this year. It has, sharply. The best comparison is therefore of capacity, and the difference is nearly three-to-one.* He says that Soviet coal production, only one-tenth of ours a quarter century ago, now equals ours. True, but he omits the fact that we have shifted from coal to oil, and our oil output exceeds that of the USSR today six-fold! One result is that we have virtually completed the conversion of the railroads to Diesel operation and no longer manufacture steam locomotives at all, while the USSR is in the earliest stages of that change and still makes more steam than Diesel engines.

The author seems to forget that the accumulation of capital, which necessarily produces economic expansion, is a law of capitalism, and cannot cease to operate, except for temporary interruptions, as long as capitalism exists. Under socialism, to be sure, it proceeds at a much faster rate, but, again, the opposite effect of war upon the American and Soviet economies has prevented the gap from closing rapidly in the most modern fields of industry.**

Buck writes that Soviet industry produces types of equipment "far beyond the capacity of any other country except the United States" to produce. He omits West Germany—an economic and political error of considerable importance. He does not explain why the Soviet Union finds it necessary to supplement its own production of machinery by imports to a vastly greater extent than it imports consumer goods. And it is a fact that the 22,000-ton icebreaker recently ordered from Finland by the USSR is considerably larger than any vessel, military or merchant, ever to go down the ways of a Soviet shipyard.

Buck states that in the use of atomic energy "in industry, to produce for peace, the Soviet Union has overtaken the U.S. and is now far out in front." I doubt that he has been given access to classified Soviet data. As far as public information is concerned, the one Soviet power plant now operating is quite small (5,000 kilowatts), and the one American plant for commercial use now well under construction is several times as large (60,000 kilowatts), although still only one-thirtieth as powerful as the Grand Coulee and

* The war-production-stimulated surge to capacity output a couple of years ago may possibly be repeated, and expansion of capacity in the United States since World War II has been exactly as large, in tonnage, as in the USSR. For us, of course, that represents only a fraction of former capacity. For the USSR it represents a multiplication.

** For 25 peacetime years, Soviet industrial growth has averaged 15% per annum: twice the top level of brief boom spurts here or in Japan, and three to five times capitalism's best long-term rate of growth. Overall Soviet output has climbed from 1/15 to well over 1/3 of U.S., and has long since passed any other country.

Stalingrad hydroelectric installations. American Big Business is moving into atomic energy in a big way, and while there can be no doubt that its ultimate use under socialism will be greater, there is no basis whatever for comparative predictions covering the next several years.

The author describes the Volga-Don waterway for pages on end and in a tone that can only leave the reader with the impression that it is unique in the world. But United States inland waterway traffic is almost three times as large as Soviet (reflecting the overall ratio between the two economies), and the USSR is only now adopting the more efficient pusher-type tugs that have been standard equipment in the Mississippi-Missouri basin for some years.*

There is a naive willingness on the author's part to draw long-term scientific conclusions from individual observations. He quotes, without comment, the assurance of a Cossack farmer that "our climate is *different* now" in the vicinity of the Tsimlianskaia Reservoir. That reservoir has been in existence for only three years, and it takes much longer than that before one knows whether any change in rainfall is a result of normal vagaries in weather or an actual change in climate.

This point is important because of the afforestation fiasco. Six years ago, the Soviet Union announced a plan to change the face of nature by the introduction over the whole of the Ukraine and adjacent territories of a new system of agriculture based on shelter belts and a system of crop rotation developed by Academician Williams (a Russian). When American scientists at that time expressed doubt as to its effectiveness over so huge an area, with varying sub-climates and soil types, they were denounced as having sold their science to the cold warriors. Last year, however, the head of the Agricultural Department of the Soviet State Planning Commission was removed because of what Khrushchev, in one of his major reports on agriculture, called unjustified and stereotyped application of this new system of agriculture without consideration of local conditions. The "Plan for the Transformation of Nature" is no longer mentioned or reported on. Afforestation is now again applied, as before 1948, only to those specific localities where it is suitable. One no longer hears of the Williams system, but, instead, of the Mal'tsev system, a perfected version of the planting-on-stubble farming long known and practiced to a limited degree in this country.

Much the same is to be said of the author's reference to "seed vernalization," which, twenty years ago, was touted as proof of the superiority of Soviet agricultural science over capitalist, just as the

* Missouri freight traffic has risen six-fold in the past two years, thanks to exactly the same type of huge dam construction and riverway improvement as is taking place in the USSR.

"Transformation of Nature" plan was more recently. Vernalization has proved to be a useful technique, but it has not solved the Soviet grain problem, as is clear from the heroic—and successful—effort this year to meet that problem by the old-fashioned device of planting more land. Soviet agricultural science has many achievements to its credit, but they have not proven superior *en masse* to those developed elsewhere in the world during the past generation, as is most clearly indicated by crop yields per acre and meat and milk yields per animal over the country at large. The sole point of superiority lies as yet in the social organization of Soviet society, making it possible to open vast Siberian acreages in a single year by government plan, with the volunteer labor of 150,000 youth under no economic pressure to leave their more comfortable homes and positions.

Emphasis here is placed on this rather than on the collective farm system as such, for, as was made amply clear in Khrushchev's reports, thought of private gain, despite Buck's opinion to the contrary, is very much a part of the consciousness of the collective farm peasantry *as a class*. For this reason, it was necessary to *multiply* the level of prices paid, *cancel* certain taxes and levies on this class, and make other very radical reforms to reverse a *drop* in the number of cattle and the output of certain crops and to stimulate a rise all along the line. These reforms seem to be working admirably, and their success is a clear indication that "personal interests," to use the Soviet phrase, loom very large indeed in the mind of the collective farmer, Mr. Buck to the contrary notwithstanding.

The author berates the capitalist press for referring to a "crisis" in Soviet agriculture. Khrushchev, too, rejects the term, but himself made public a situation, in time of peace, after postwar reconstruction was announced to be essentially complete, when there was a sharp *drop* in the livestock upon which the country depends for meat, milk, butter, and cheese, so that these radical reforms were necessary. And when Mr. Buck writes that the capitalist press, "if it wanted to tell the truth," would "describe actual farms, such as I visited," I am amazed that a man of his experience should ask that judgment be based on what one man can see, even if he visits not one or two farms, but several dozen. There are thousands of farms fully as good as those he visited, but if he would trouble to read Khrushchev's report, he would know that there are also thousands whose yields of milk per cow are a *fraction* of the figure he quotes, and very, very low by comparison to any Western European nation with a non-feudal agriculture, or to the United States or his own Canada. That is another reason for the recent reforms.

The great accomplishment of collective farming is that it has enabled the Soviet Union to feed the rapidly increasing army of in-

dustrial workers and professionals and their families, thus in turn making possible the stupendous progress of the country in industry, science, and culture. But it has not done this by expanding agricultural output in relation to the size of the population as a whole: on a per capita basis, agricultural output of food stuffs and feed grains has barely crept ahead of population growth.* What has happened is that the greater efficiency of collective farming, equipped as it is with machinery and practicing a more elaborate division of labor, has made it possible for a smaller proportion of the population to feed the whole and hence for ever larger numbers to leave agriculture to help expand industry and defend the country in wartime.

Now that decreasing international tension permits the Soviet government to seek a radical upturn in living standard within two or three years, as announced, it is striving to raise agricultural production more rapidly than the rise in total population. In doing this, the figures show, as do policy speeches, that it is giving greater weight than ever before to the state farms, which are factory farms with a purely socialist form of organization—and, incidentally, a vastly higher living standard for their workers, with homes and year-round jobs, than our factory farms provide for the millions of Mexican slave laborers (as the *New York Times* has actually called them), Negroes, and whites who follow the crops in our country.

The new state farms are staffed largely by Communists and Young Communists from the city working class and the intelligentsia to which it has given birth—the most socially conscious section of Soviet society. The collective farms, on the other hand, consist of families who have been in their villages from time immemorial and who themselves were private property owners on that very land just one generation ago. As a result, the “remnants of capitalism in their consciousness” are stronger than in any other section of the Soviet population, and the collective farmers have not advanced beyond the stage at which every expansion in acreage and shift in emphasis between crops and livestock has to have an immediate personal material incentive. The recent radical reforms in farm prices recognize this; and, on the other hand, Beria was condemned, among other things, on the charge that he resisted the introduction of these reforms. Their vital importance is indicated, on the one hand, by the drop in livestock over the whole country a couple of years ago and,

* The 3½-fold rise in living standard since 1913 reflects chiefly items not then present in the standard—electric light, coal chemicals, gas cooking in a very few cities today, metalware, mechanical passenger transportation, consumer use of modern communications, health facilities, cultural facilities, plus leather boots in place of bark sandals, manufactured clothing in place of homespun, and furniture instead of a hewn table, bench, and a pallet atop a stove.

on the other, by the rise both in ploughed acreage and in livestock now that it is more profitable to the farmers.

If these facts be kept in mind, the reader will better understand future developments in Soviet agriculture, until the time—not just around the corner—when the collective farmer's social consciousness approaches that of the city worker and the state farm worker. And it will also be easier to understand developments in the cities if it be remembered that the working class consists largely of people of recent farm origin and will continue to grow chiefly from that source.

In this connection, it is necessary to correct another factual error. Tim Buck refers to the Soviet Union as having a "predominantly urban population." Malenkov, on the other hand, says the urban population is 80 million, which is little more than half the rural population. That, too, helps to explain much.

Finally, a word of caution is required with regard to the vast expansion of agriculture in Siberia (the crop was doubled in a single year!). Much of this territory—and particularly the new lands in Kazakhstan to the south—is actually an area of marginal rainfall: dry-farming country. While, eventually, crops can be stabilized by irrigation and other means, an unusually severe drought at this point could have very serious results. The Soviet Union is far beyond the stage where that would mean famine—as is proven by the fact that nothing of the sort occurred in 1946, when the worst drought of the century struck European Russia. But a crop failure in the new territories could sharply affect, for the year in which it occurs, the increase in national living standard planned for that year, because agriculture is directly stated to be the basis of this rise. Enemies of the USSR would draw all kinds of fanciful conclusions from this. My point is that it is necessary to reckon with this possibility rather than to indulge, as too many friends of the Soviet Union have done, in wild fancies that have not corresponded with reality.*

Advocates of coexistence have lost credence among their associates because, for years, they have been given and have circulated a picture of the Soviet Union corresponding to what it will be like a decade or two hence, rather than to the reality of today. Event after event has brought that reality home, entirely aside from the lies and exaggerations of the press. And when a man like Tim Buck, en-

* It has just been announced that preliminary surveys are under way for a 1,000-mile diversion of the upper Irtysh River to the Aral Sea to irrigate the new lands. When this is accomplished, several years hence, the dangers inherent in dry farming will have been met. This vast project is a much more modest version of the Davydov river-turning project of a few years ago. That would have involved a diversion large enough for shipping and power as well. This is simply an enormous irrigation ditch.

joying great prestige among the most consistent advocates of co-existence, permits his justified enthusiasm over progress observed on repeated visits to cause him to ignore the reports of the Soviet leaders themselves, and to perpetuate this picture of a socialist society as though it were communist in material attainment and social consciousness, he performs no service to coexistence. Nor does the sowing of illusions perform a service to the socialist movement in Canada and the United States. The truth is good enough.

The job is *not* to replace a fanciful picture by a static, objectivist presentation of the situation today, ignoring the heritage of the past. The job is to picture the USSR today in terms of where it has come from and, therefore, where it can be expected to go—and when. The other side already recognizes that it will be an immense achievement when the Soviet Union attains our present production per head of population—and therefore the basis for a superior living standard—20 years from now, as its established rate of growth indicates. Let us realize that, too, and stop dreaming that it is 1975.

And let us take satisfaction from the fact that socialist distribution of wealth and health has now brought the Soviet Union a lower death rate than that of the United States. This is perhaps the USSR's greatest overall human achievement.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS

BY POLITICAL ECONOMIST

There have been two main phases in China's economic development since the Liberation. In the first, lasting from 1949 to 1952, the country was effectively unified as a modern multi-national state; fundamental and elementary revolutionary changes—such as the smashing of feudal agrarian property relations and feudal relations between the sexes and between the nationalities—were carried out, and the task of economic rehabilitation was completed. In the second, which began at the end of 1952 with the promulgation of the first Five Year Plan and is an ongoing process, a concerted drive for *socialist* industrialization and for the *socialist* transformation of Chinese society was initiated. Naturally, there was no sharp break between

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the two phases, but the dichotomy is convenient and not too misleading.

When the People's Government took over in 1949, the country was a shambles. Politically, socially, and economically, China had never been more disorganized. Production had dropped catastrophically, the process of circulation was violently disrupted, and there was chronic hyperinflation. In the phase of economic rehabilitation, prices were quickly stabilized and production and reproduction *on an expanding basis* restored so that by the end of 1952 virtually all previous peak records of output had been re-attained and, in many cases, exceeded. There is less need to go into detail on this period since it was so adequately covered by J. H. Robertson's article ("The Economic Transformation of China," MR, May 1953). The summary statistics, which cannot tell the whole story and particularly that of the land reform (certainly the largest if not the greatest of all revolutions) are presented in Tables 1 and 2. It should be noted that in 1952 the grain crop of over 160 million tons was around 15 percent and the cotton crop of 1,290,000 tons over 50 percent above previous peak production, and that the production of other commercial crops also showed striking increases.

TABLE 1
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT (1949=100)

	1950	1951	1952
Grain	117	128	145
Cotton	160	235	291

Source: *State Statistical Bureau Communiqué*, September 28, 1953.

TABLE 2
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT (covering 35 major commodities)
(Previously recorded peak year=100)

	Consumer Goods		Investment Goods
	Total	Goods	Goods
1949	56	70	30
1952	126	132	116

Source: UN, *World Economic Report 1951-52*, p. 52.

Total industrial output increased by nearly 37 percent per annum,* a phenomenal rate of growth however one looks at it. The essential point to grasp is that the Chinese people was at long last sloughing off its feudal heritage of backwardness and was laying the indispensable foundations of industrialization, at the same time that it was raising its standards of living—modestly, to be sure, but at least

* Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government to the First National People's Congress, September 23, 1954," *People's China*, October 16, 1954. Most of the figures subsequently cited are from this source.

on equitable, durable, and expanding lines—and all this in a period during most of which it was engaged in war.

Nothing is easier than to take this recovery and progress for granted, or to discount it as a more or less automatic reversal of Kuomintang disintegration and decay. In fact, it was an extraordinarily brilliant performance even on a narrowly “technical” level. To give but one example out of many: China had never before had a unified national currency, and a monetary system could hardly be said to exist. By 1952 there was no such thing as a currency or monetary problem. The great initial successes were possible only because the people for the first time in its history was consciously and actively participating in the social process, and because government and people were communicating on the right wave length.

But however impressive, the levels reached in 1952 were only the prologue if China was to attain her rightful place as an advanced, modern, *and* socialist country. At the end of 1952, the first Five Year Plan, envisaging an expansion of agricultural production of the order of 30 percent and of industrial production by many times more, was adopted. The Plan was not a bolt from the blue. Coal output was already over 60 million tons, steel production was over 2 million tons, the output of electricity was 4.8 billion kwh, and so on. The state sector accounted for just under a half of *total* industrial production and over three-fifths of *modern* industrial production, occupied the commanding heights of modern industry, and was rapidly extending the scope of its activities in commerce. Industrial production, particularly large-scale production, had been fairly systematically planned on an annual basis for over a year. Private enterprise was being increasingly geared to operating in terms of purchases from and sales to state organizations. And in agriculture there had been a remarkable growth, both of mutual-aid teams (an ingenious adaptation of a traditional Chinese form to overcome some of the terrible handicaps of isolated individual production) and of rural marketing and supply and credit cooperatives, to the point where the Chinese cooperative movement was the biggest in the world. In other words, the economic and social prerequisites for planned economy were coming into being.

Nevertheless, the first Five Year Plan was a discontinuous leap, a qualitative as well as a quantitative change, registering the conscious initiation and acceleration of the transition to socialism in a still backward economy in which modern industry accounted for less than 30 percent of aggregate output. In considering China's chances of success, it is natural to compare her position at the end of 1952 with that of Russia in 1927.

China's technical base, both absolutely and relatively to her

population of nearly 600 million, was undeniably weaker, and her standards of living no less undeniably lower. Russia was also probably richer in natural resources and in virgin cultivable land, although, contrary to the opinion, as unanimous as it is misguided, of Western so-called experts, China is sufficiently rich in both not to have to worry about the physical limitations either to industrialization or to the expansion of agricultural output. (She is particularly well-endowed with coal, iron, and non-ferrous metals, the Holy Trinity of modern industry, has a large hydro-electric potential, and is not deficient in oil and the rarer minerals.) Russia also had a larger supply of technicians and skilled labor. But against this, we must set, first, the availability of Russian technical help; second, the striking adaptability and capacity to learn, of the Chinese labor force, on which all foreign observers have commented; and, third, the intensive and highly skilled nature of Chinese farming, plus the long tradition of large-scale public works, a combination which should ease the transition to factory conditions and factory discipline. As far as the internal political situation is concerned, the fact that capitalism was less developed in China and that the Kuomintang was universally detested, means that there is far less internal opposition in China than there was in Russia, which is reflected in the fact that there are no signs of the inner party crises which afflicted Russia in the 20s and 30s.

Moreover, China today has one inestimable advantage Russia could not have in 1927, namely, the existence of a powerful socialist neighbor at the head of a socialist bloc. Russia had already pioneered in the establishment of a planned socialist economy and once for all demonstrated its practicability. Russia had paid "the penalty of being first" in the development of socialism, just as had Britain in the development of capitalism, inevitably committing certain errors which China could avoid: China, in other words, had all the benefits, negative as well as positive, of Russian experience. Similarly, Russian aid was readily available to China in the form of large amounts of capital goods acquired in exchange for Chinese exports of agricultural products and minerals. During its first Five Year Plan, the USSR had to obtain many of its capital goods from the West on most unfavorable terms and to employ untrustworthy capitalist technologists whose adaptability to planned economy was severely limited. Lastly, the international situation is much more favorable for China than it was for Russia.* The very fact of the existence of Russia and the Eastern

* The contrary opinion expressed by Rostow (*The Prospects for Communist China*, New York, 1954, p. 260) is surely perverse. A kind of Maupertuisian Principle of Least Ignorance seems to operate in America today with respect to self-styled experts on Russia and even more so on China. Rostow's book is crammed with crude errors as well as suffused with a deep hatred of New China.

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bloc means that China need not concentrate on defense and push the socialization of industry and collectivization of agriculture by forced marches to the same extent as Russia had no choice but to do in the period of complete capitalist encirclement. Which is not to say that China will neglect its defenses or that the arms burden, in terms of both manpower and resources, is not a serious handicap, but only that it is not as grave as it was for Russia in the decades before World War II.

In short, Russia's first and second Five Year Plans were a calculated risk that had to be taken if Russia was to establish a socialist state capable both of defending itself against a hostile world and of ensuring economic expansion on a socialist basis. Because the experiment succeeded and succeeded brilliantly, we are prone to forget the enormous risks and costs involved. In the case of China, the element of risk is incomparably smaller and the existence and accumulated experience of a friendly Russia make all the difference in the world, in spite of the innumerable problems to be solved.

Let us now briefly review some of the highlights of the last two years, before outlining a few of the most important of these still remaining problems.

Aggregate output of industry and agriculture increased by around 12 percent *annually* in 1953 and 1954, and 1954 aggregate output is estimated to be 22 percent of 1949. Total *industrial* production increased by no less than 33 percent in 1953, almost as great an annual rate of growth as in the period of rehabilitation; and planned modern industrial output in 1954 is estimated to be *over four times* 1949.

Chou En-lai rightly emphasized three vital indicators of economic progress in his above-cited Report on the Work of the Government to the National People's Congress on September 23, 1954. First, modern industrial output which was less than a fifth of aggregate industrial and agricultural output in 1949, now constitutes almost a third. Second, the output of means of production, the essential lower stories of the edifice of industrialization, rose from 28.8 percent of total industrial output in 1949 to an estimated 43.3 percent of the far greater industrial output of 1954. Even so, the estimated output of consumer goods in 1954 was over three times that of 1949, so that industrialization is not being brought about at the cost of any lowering in living standards. Third, the socialist sector in industry is continually advancing. The proportion of total industrial output produced by state, cooperative, and joint state and private (state capitalist) enterprises rose from 37 percent in 1949 to an estimated 71 percent in 1954. As state enterprises, by definition wholly socialist, account for well over half of industrial output as compared with barely a third in 1949, as cooperative enterprises are socialist or

semi-socialist, and as joint state and private enterprises are undergoing gradual socialization, it can be seen that the progress towards socialism in the crucial industrial sector is unmistakable.

TABLE 3
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT BY SECTORS (Percentage distribution)

	1949	1952	1953	1952
		All Industry		Modern Industry
State	33.9	49.6	53	61
State capitalist	2.4	4.3		6
Cooperative	1.0	3.8	9	3
Private	62.7	42.3	38	30

Source: *State Statistical Bureau Communiqués*, September 28, 1953, and September 12, 1954.

Lest percentages be considered misleading, we cite the following absolute figures for estimated production of some key industrial commodities in 1954, based on actual output in the first eight months or so of the year, the figures in brackets expressing 1954 output as a percentage of 1949.

TABLE 4
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1954

Electric power	10.8	billions kwh.	(250)
Coal	82	million tons	(260)
Pig Iron	3.03	" "	(1,240)
Crude steel	2.17	" "	(1,370)
Metal-working machines	13,513	units	(850)
Cement	4.73	million tons	(720)
Cotton yarn	4.6	million bales	(260)
Machine-made paper	480	thousand tons	(450)

Source: Chou En-lai Report.

By the end of the second year of the first Five Year Plan, China had become the second industrial power in Asia, having significantly outstripped India. The first Five Year Plan calls for the new construction or improvement of some 600 large-scale industrial projects, "the sinews of which . . . are the 141 the Soviet Union is helping us to build," including iron and steel works, non-ferrous plants, coal mines, petroleum wells and refineries, plants for making heavy machinery and cars, tractors and aircraft, power stations and chemical works. Of these 141 major projects, as of September, 1954, 17 were wholly or partly complete and in operation, 34 were under construction, and work was scheduled to start on the remainder in the near future. Most will be completed by 1958, though a few will only come into operation at the end of the second Five Year Plan.

At the planned rate of progress and barring war, by 1957, total

steel production should be five to seven million tons, and coal production over 100 million tons per annum. By then, China may well have equalled Japan in industrial capacity. By 1960, China should be the first industrial power in Asia, and by the end of the third Five Year Plan, China's industrial output should be of the same order of magnitude as that of the major Western European powers.

The expansion of production and the transition to socialism are both bound to be slower in agriculture than in industry. Weather conditions were exceptionally adverse both in 1953 and 1954. Nevertheless, output of grain was over 165 million tons in 1953, and output in 1954 was expected to be 50 percent higher than in 1949 and slightly higher than in 1953, in spite of the biggest floods within living memory. In the 1931 floods, which were not as severe as those of last year, 3.7 million people lost their lives. In 1954, although one-tenth of the cultivated land was inundated, disaster was kept within bounds, thanks to the long-term water conservancy projects inaugurated after Liberation, the mobilization of the people to keep the rivers under control, and the over-fulfillment of production quotas in the unaffected areas. Half the flooded land was quickly drained and replanted, and over half the remainder was being drained and prepared for cultivation in September. The contrast with the picayune measures of the Kuomintang, with its cap-in-hand dependence on foreign missionary charity in the face of the 1931 calamity, could not possibly be more eloquent. China is already self-sufficient or more than self-sufficient in cotton and tobacco, and has increased the output of all agricultural products except edible oils beyond previous maximums. She is also producing hemp and jute in quantity and, as a result of the American embargo policy, has developed rubber plantations which should soon be yielding substantial crops.

In the sphere of agricultural organization, there has been an impressive absolute advance—not so much in socialist forms, which although growing rapidly are still, and will for some time remain, a small wave in the ocean of Chinese agriculture—as in mixed co-operative forms serving as training grounds and intermediate stages on the path of socialist evolution. By September 1954, there were over 160 million members of rural marketing and supply cooperatives, and 50,000 rural credit cooperatives. Sixty percent of all peasant households were organized in mutual-aid teams and agricultural producers' cooperatives. The latter are called "collective farms of a lower form," and it is a vulgar error to regard them as collective farms in the usual sense. They represent a great step forward in productive efficiency since, with an average membership of about twenty, they permit of a more rational division of labor and group planning. Distribution of the product is based on contributions of

land and other means of production as well as of labor, but it is hoped gradually to increase the proportion attributed to labor. In December 1953, when the movement for the rapid extension of agricultural producers' cooperatives was launched, there were only 14,000. By August 1954, there were 100,000, and it is hoped that there will be 500,000 embracing ten million peasant households by this year's spring sowing, and that over half China's peasantry will have joined producers' cooperatives by the end of 1957. The evolution of higher social and technical agricultural forms cannot occur without the peasants' voluntary participation and, to use a phrase which runs like a tactical leitmotif through the Common Program of 1949 and the Constitution of 1954, is a *step-by-step* process. There have already been big increases in agricultural productivity as a result of the land reform.

Problems of the Transition to Socialism

The most obvious difficulty China has to cope with in the transition period is the general problem of planning in a mixed and unevenly developed economy. Agriculture, which accounted for 54 percent of aggregate output in 1953, is predominantly non-socialist. Handicraft production accounted for another 15 percent. About a third of industrial output is still produced by the capitalist sector, which has grown absolutely though not relatively, and private commerce handles 20 percent of wholesale and 50 percent of retail trade. The national minority areas, which embrace 6 percent of the total mainland population, are much more backward than the rest, feudal and even pre-feudal vestiges not yet having been completely liquidated among a few of the more remote groups. No wonder, as Chou En-lai reported, "the entire work on the formulation of the first Five Year Plan is still not finally completed" and "many of its details are still being supplemented and amended." While the main drive is bound to be concentrated on the expansion of heavy industry and the state sector, growth must be balanced and synchronized as between the different sectors and areas. The less developed sectors and areas cannot be allowed to fall too far behind the culturally as well as economically more advanced. With respect to the 20 million or so artisans, it is hoped to achieve the "cooperativization" of handicraft production by the middle of the second Five Year Plan. As for the minorities, the People's Government has been outstandingly successful in all phases of its nationality policy; at the same time, because of their greater backwardness, the transition period in the minority areas must necessarily be longer and demand the greatest possible flexibility as to means.

In the sphere of modern industry, the problems of planning in

a mixed economy are not as intractable as they might at first sight appear to be. In the first half of 1954, 80 percent of the output of capitalist industrial enterprises in the eight leading cities was turned out by firms working to government orders. The planned 1954 output of state capitalist enterprises, the chief intermediate form for the socialist transformation of capitalist enterprise, was more than double that of 1953. Article 10 of the Constitution declares: "The policy of the State towards capitalist industry and commerce is: use, restrict, transform." In contradistinction to the abolition of feudal property relations, the abolition of capitalist property relations is going to be gradual, step by step, and peaceful.

Nevertheless, the difficulties must not be minimized. To quote Chou again: "Planned industrial production and construction is an entirely new field to us. We must, therefore, learn while we work. . . . Insufficient technical manpower and poor technical administration also present an important problem in industry." Russian assistance can facilitate and relieve but cannot solve the critical shortages here. One can only call attention to the mobilization of labor initiative, to the big increases in the labor forces engaged in modern industry and in labor productivity—by 1952 per capita coal-mining output was over half that in Britain—and to the spectacular expansion of higher and particularly technical education. By the end of 1953, China was producing heavy steel rails, seamless steel tubing, high-grade carbon and alloy structural steel, complex electrical machinery and machine tools, large-size X-ray apparatus, and various antibiotics.

But it is in agriculture that the most dramatic problems in the transition to socialism arise. Chinese farming is highly land and labor-intensive and equally highly capital-extensive. Full-fledged collectivization, "collective farms of the higher form," require both large-scale mechanization and progressively more social cohesion on the part of the peasantry. Without the further development of heavy industry, large-scale mechanization is out of the question, although there is, of course, considerable room for improvement in the use of better agricultural implements, more work animals, fertilizers, and so on, in all of which spheres planned advances are being and will continue to be made. As for the task of raising the peasant's social consciousness, it is precisely here that the various cooperative organizations play a decisive constructive role. By the time three-quarters of a peasant's receipts from his agricultural producers' cooperative are based on his labor and only one-quarter on his land contribution—the present proportion in most cases is 50-50—he has reached the point where it should be relatively simple to take the next step of distribution according to labor alone.

In this connection, incidentally, it should be remarked that the

problem of the Chinese rich peasant is much less acute than that of the Russian kulak, whose liquidation created a major crisis in 1931-1932. Rich-peasant economy was never very significant in China and has, if anything, declined. The Constitution adopted on September 20, 1954—which is a formalization of the means and policies as well as of the programs and goals of the Chinese people in the light of the last five years' progress—defines present policy towards the rich-peasant economy as its restriction and gradual elimination.

In concluding these remarks on agriculture, it is appropriate to quote from Liu Shao-chi's "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China to the First National People's Congress, September 15, 1954" (*People's China*, October 1, 1954): ". . . the Chinese Revolution has manifested a depth, thoroughness, and mass scale absolutely unparalleled in all previous revolutionary movements." Nevertheless, it is apparently necessary to repeat *ad nauseam* that the full socialization of Chinese agriculture is going to be a long-drawn-out process of gradual evolution for which it is much too early to set a terminal date.

A word about the population problem, which seems to raise so many doubts in the West. Without entering into theoretical or ideological considerations, it is safe to say that a country engaged in sustained and rapid economic development, in which it is telescoping into ten years what in most capitalist countries took half a century, is most unlikely to be plagued by over-population. As it happens, China's population is increasing by about two percent per annum, while the yearly increase in aggregate output is of the order of 12 percent. If the biggest increase is occurring in industry, agricultural output is also rising, and there is no need to worry about either the erosion of the margin of feasible improvements *within* present technical potentialities or the exhaustion of the supply of virgin cultivable land within the foreseeable future. No, as far as China is concerned, the Malthusian bogey is as thin as "a soup made from the shadow of a ghost of an imaginary pigeon." It should also be noted that rural and urban purchasing power has been rising. The rise has been moderate not because of waste or of excessive allocations to armaments, which in sharp contrast to the United States absorb only 21 percent of Government expenditures, but because of the need to forego petty benefits now for the sake of much larger benefits in the not too distant future. The longer time-horizon of a socialist society is one of the strongest theoretical arguments for socialism.

Finally, there is the problem posed by the international situation. The perennial threat of American aggression imposes the need to build up and maintain adequate defense forces. At the same time, as already indicated, China's position is much better than was Russia's

before World War II. She enjoys the firm alliance of the socialist bloc and the friendship of India and Burma, not to mention the goodwill of progressives everywhere. Her immediate land borders are safe and the real danger stems from American and American-instigated attacks by sea and air. The most important contribution the American people can make to Chinese economic advance is to curb their rulers' aggressive designs against a country whose only crime is to have freed itself from imperialist and feudal exploitation and to have entered on the path of socialist development. China has stood up, and all progressive mankind is taller by a head for it.

JOHN PETER ALTGELD

BY RUSSELL A. FRASER

Not early nor all at once did Altgeld become a reformer. As a young man he cared nothing for intangibles like social justice: what he sought was material success. In this he was the child of his parents who had left southern Germany in 1848, not as embattled revolutionaries but as ambitious peasants. The boy John Peter, born on December 30, 1847, they took with them to a farm near Mansfield, Ohio.

Altgeld's childhood was a round of hard labor, dominated by a father who beat his children with a more than perfunctory zeal. It was a time, moreover, of hatred for Catholics and foreigners: when John Peter was eight or nine, patriotic citizens of nearby Louisville and Cincinnati shed blood against the foreigners in their midst. Perhaps the circumspection which marked his first years in public life derived from that conviction of apartness which early and indelibly was impressed on the boy. Later he came to rejoice in it: "It was the crowd on one side and John Peter Altgeld on the other."

In 1857 a memorable decision in the case of Dred Scott, escaped slave, was handed down by Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, once, in Andrew Jackson's day, a fiery radical, now full of years and honor,

This is the second of a series on the great radicals of the past. The author is on the faculty of Duke University where he teaches English.

impeccably conservative. The pattern was already familiar. In 1861 Major Anderson hauled down the flag at Fort Sumter, and the War Between The States was a fact. Altgeld was sixteen when, in 1864, he joined the Ohio Home Guards. In the swamps of Virginia, he fell ill of "Chickahominy fever." Many in his regiment died. He himself escaped narrowly. But the fever was to plague him all his life.

With the end of his service he came back to Ohio and enrolled in the high school at Mansfield. There followed further study at Gailey's "select seminary" at Lexington. Equipped with a certificate, Altgeld commenced teaching, in Woodville, at the age of nineteen. Among his colleagues was Emma Ford, daughter of a well-to-do Ohio merchant. Altgeld proposed marriage. It was her father who rejected him: he was too poor. Not one to whimper, he threw up the job he had held for two years and, with ten dollars in pocket, headed West. His tramp ended in Savannah, Missouri. There he taught school, worked on farms. At night he read law. By 1871 he had advanced to the bar. A year more, and he was city attorney. But if his rise was phenomenal, it was marked by nothing more than a zeal for self-advancement.

It was the Granger revolt that brought him his first elective office. Throughout America, the fantastic corruption of the Grant administration had spurred liberals to renewed activity. In 1873, on the collapse of the banking house of Jay Cooke and Sons, the farmers in desperation turned to their Granges, made of them a power for reform. When the governor of Minnesota himself declared, "It is time to take these robber corporations by the scruff of the neck and shake them over hell!" Altgeld listened in earnest. Bolting the Bourbon Democracy, he set up as People's candidate for prosecuting attorney of Andrew County, Missouri. He was elected. Yet the job proved irksome. Within eleven months he had tendered his resignation and left for Chicago.

The city to which he came had been gutted four years since by the Great Fire. But the fire that ravaged it in 1875 was a hatred for alien creeds. Said Joseph Medill: "Every lamp-post in Chicago will be decorated with a communistic carcass if necessary to prevent wholesale incendiarism." Altgeld was no incendiary. Aloof from politics now, he sought work as a lawyer. So poor was he at first that he had to borrow money to have his boots halfsoled. He persevered. In 1877 he returned to Ohio, married Emma Ford. It was a measure of his increasing success.

Dabbling in real estate with what money he had saved, he was very soon a wealthy man. Uncommonly shrewd, uncommonly acquisitive, in time he possessed holdings worth a million dollars. His was

the classic American story, and not Collis P. Huntington nor Pierpont Morgan himself worked harder to give it substance.

His entry into the politics of Chicago coincided with the first election of Grover Cleveland in 1884. Altgeld himself was nominated by the Democracy for Congress, and though he failed of election, his showing, in a strong Republican district, was impressive. His record was not. The resurgence of labor, hard on the disastrous strikes of 1877; the hangings of the Molly Maguires in the Pennsylvania coal fields; and the "Strike of the Millionaires against the Miners" at Spring Valley, Illinois—these dramatic events seemed not to move him. Even the diatribes of the press against "foreign scum," which grew daily in scurrile violence, did not evoke a protest.

On the day of his nomination for Congress, however, he published a book which gave indication of change. For in *Our Penal Machinery and Its Victims*, Altgeld bore witness to the correlation of poverty and crime. "The great multitudes annually arrested . . . are the poor, the unfortunate, the young and the neglected." The victims of law enforcement are recruited "from among those that are fighting an unequal fight in the struggle for existence." And with this perception went a more than pious humanity, a championing of the underdog. From the sheer goodness of heart revealed in that book might come an urge to reform the abuses decried there. But the reformer was scarcely fledged before an event of terrible magnitude begot in him questionings far more intense. This was the Haymarket tragedy of May 4, 1886.

Chicago was ripe for such a disaster. Agitation among workers for the eight-hour day excited all the venom of the press, the hysteria of business, the rash mutterings of an anarchist minority. On May 3rd, at McCormick's reaper works, these volatile elements were fused: a clash between union men and scabs was joined by police, who shot to death two of the strikers. The *Arbeiter-Zeitung* of anarchist August Spies called for revenge. A mass meeting to denounce the atrocity was scheduled on May 4 in Haymarket Square. If there were those who hoped for violence they must have been chagrined: by ten in the evening the orderly gathering had begun to disperse. It was then that Chief Bonfield, at the head of almost two hundred police, gave his order to march on the crowd. Sam Fielden, anarchist, was proclaiming the peaceable nature of the meeting when the Haymarket bomb was thrown. In the carnage that followed, the police fired on each other. One of their number was killed on the spot, six were mortally injured, sixty-seven bore wounds. The fatalities of the workers were never counted.

Chicago surrendered its intellect until the tragedy was played out. On May 27th, indictments were returned against thirty-one

anarchists, eight of whom eventually stood trial. Of these only two had been present at the bombing. July saw the trial, a masterpiece of errant justice, presided over by Judge Joseph Gary. The verdict was foreordained: death by hanging for seven of the defendants, fifteen years' imprisonment for the eighth. Appeals for justice proved fruitless; appeals for mercy were cried down by men like Marshall Field. John Peter Altgeld took part in neither.

On the tenth of November, Governor Oglesby commuted to life the sentences of Fielden and Schwab. Defendant Louis Lingg chewed dynamite in Cook County jail, scrawling in his blood: "Long live anarchy!" On November 11, 1887, the four condemned men were marched, hooded and handcuffed, to the scaffold. The identity of the bomber was never discovered.

"Capitalism," wrote the *Workmen's Advocate*, "speaks of the legal murder of its victims as the last act in the tragedy." But Altgeld had yet to be heard from. It was he who would write the last act. To his friend, labor leader George Schilling, he said, "I want to do something, not just make a speech. . . . I want power, to get hold of the handle that controls things. When I do, I will give it a twist!" To make a beginning he stood in 1886 as Democratic-United Labor candidate for judge of the Superior Court of Cook County. With his election he began to speak out. A first public statement on labor had been the radical demand for compulsory government arbitration of disputes. There followed, first, his recognition "that it is the duty of society to take care of its indigent"; then a demand for social legislation to meet the evil of sweatshops. Renewed attacks on the "socialistic, atheistic, alcoholic European classes" who made Chicago their rendezvous provoked at last from Altgeld *The Immigrant's Answer*. The publication in 1890 of the first volume of *Live Questions*, a collection of his papers and addresses, underscored his new role. The *Tribune* remarked it by calling him communist. It was signal proof that he had arrived. When in 1891 he gave up his judgeship, his was a Fabian withdrawal from politics. He would soon be back.

The Democratic party insured his return by putting him forward for governor of Illinois. Essaying the role of folksy good fellow, he canvassed the state as no other candidate before him had done. In 1892 he rode in triumph to Springfield, the first foreigner born, the first resident of Chicago, to be chosen governor. His first months in office were little distinguished. Ambitious to be senator, he showed himself a liberal spoilsman. When, however, in 1893, a Negro was lynched in Decatur, the governor issued a state proclamation that bristles still with his wrath. The shooting, soon after, of strikers at Lemont, inspired a report in which Altgeld put the blame on the employer.

His liberal supporters were not thereby appeased. They had helped elect him governor in the belief that he would pardon the three survivors of the Haymarket trial. He had bestirred himself thus far not at all. So Clarence Darrow, holding no office, came to Springfield and said, "I and the others see no excuse for waiting!" Altgeld replied, "Go tell your friends that when I am ready I will act. I do not know how I will act, but I will do what I think is right." He was convinced that a pardon would kill him politically. Issue it, he said, and "I will be a dead man!" He began to amass evidence on the case, wavering all the while between ambition and—his phrase—"the polestar of duty."

Then in 1893 Judge Gary, who had conducted the trial, wrote an article, cruel and self-damning, on "The Chicago Anarchists of 1886." Judge Gary's position was wonderfully simple: the anarchists, so justly punished, were animated only by "envy and hatred of all people whose condition in life was better than their own."

Altgeld was convinced. On June 26, 1893, he issued the pardon. He said, "As to the Senatorship, no man's ambitions had a right to stand in the way of performing a simple act of justice." It was not the pardon itself, but its character, which made him the most hated man in America. For, scorning to plead mercy as his reason—the easy and unexceptionable way—he arraigned the shocking bias of jury and judge, and so brought on himself a stream of execration to which his age affords no equal. The respectable citizens who had advocated clemency united in deploring his message of pardon. They could have countenanced mercy, but not an indictment of their class and the juridical props which sustained it. The press called Altgeld "wild-haired demagogue," "jetsam," "apologist for murder," "the Nero of the last decade of the nineteenth century." The most piquant comment, however, was made at a dinner of Harvard alumni by Robert Todd Lincoln, corporation attorney. Said the son of the Emancipator: "It is for you Harvard men to stand firm in the midst of such dangers in the republic."

If John Pardon Altgeld, as one knew him now, believed that his career was at an end, he undervalued both himself and the people. For the summit of his power was yet to be attained. He reached it in the midst of economic depression and the most terrible struggle that had ever wracked his party. When Grover Cleveland returned to Washington in 1892, it was as the hope of farmers throughout the south and west, caught up already in what came to be called the "Panic of '93." In Chicago on Labor Day, Altgeld assured the workers that "no one will starve." He was hard put to fulfill his promise. The following year saw the tragi-comic march of Coxey's Army of the Commonwealers of Christ. More serious was the mine-

workers' strike, with its wake of violence in Illinois. But dwarfing this and all else was the great Pullman boycott.

It began on May 11, 1894. Did George Pullman's workers protest a cut in wages? Pullman closed the shops. Did a temerarious committee seek discussion with him? The committee was fired. The strike was on.

A majority of the workers belonged to the American Railway Union, which voted to boycott Pullman cars. Soon ranged against it was the illegal General Managers Association, representing the twenty-four railroads serving Chicago, and pledged to resist the boycott. Damaging, too, was the refusal to cooperate of the railroad brotherhoods and the AFL, conscious as always that caution is the better part of valor. And yet the boycott was an overwhelming success. The strike in fact was won, when the railroads and the Federal government connived at the last moment to break it. Their weapons were two: an injunction, to brand the boycott illegal; and the use of Federal troops, to insure that the union be smashed.

Governor Altgeld, in Springfield, aware that the strike threatened private property, moved with exemplary success to protect it. If the militia, under his command, was less murderous than it might otherwise have been, it was also more efficient. Yet Cleveland, without consultation, ordered Federal troops to Chicago. It was the greatest insult ever delivered to the governor of a sovereign state. Altgeld's protests served only to evoke from the press new tirades against "this lying, hypocritical, demagogical, sniveling Governor of Illinois." The arrival of the troops—on Independence Day—effected something more: the violence it was supposed to have quelled. To make the cup full to overflowing, President Eugene Debs of the ARU was arrested for contempt and conspiracy. His, by a pleasant irony, was the first prosecution under the new Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Of course the strike was broken.

Altgeld, however, was not done with Pullman and Cleveland. The former he struck at first, on receiving an appeal for aid from the starving citizens of Pullman's model town, where rent gouging was the rule, and a clause in every lease enabled the management to be rid of "undesirable tenants." The refusal of Pullman to alleviate the hunger of his workers prompted Altgeld to go to the people. Money poured in. His personal triumph he followed by forcing the abolition of the company town and by exposing Pullman as a tax evader.

And this was but a start. His biennial message to the Illinois Legislature in January, 1895, he fashioned into an indictment unrivalled from the beginnings of the republic. Investigation of labor troubles must be made compulsory. The government must abandon

laissez faire for a policy of active intercession. The Federal courts must cease their corrosion of "the personal rights of the citizen." The public must learn to recognize "the marked feature of this age": the preying of unrestricted capital, "the large concerns swallowing the small ones." It must turn its eyes from the straw man of anarchy and see whence the real danger comes: "from that corruption, usurpation, insolence and oppression that go hand in hand with vast concentration of wealth." The Pullman strike he reviewed with ruthless cogency, focusing attention on its one most significant aspect: Government by Injunction, "a very great convenience to corporations." He was indeed a new kind of executive.

And now it was time to go after Cleveland. The President's action in demonetizing silver seemed, to the embattled Democracy, an act of utter betrayal. A southern farmer represented all his fellows when he wrote, "With a few million Airm contracting the money in use to be able to buy too dollars worth of property with one dollar, this is no longer a free country." Out in Kansas, Mary Elizabeth Lease advised her hearers to "stop raising corn and begin raising hell!" The greatest furor since Abolition days was in the making. On the ashes of Grange and Greenback parties arose the Farmers' Alliance, whose Populist movement numbered two million men, whose banner proclaimed the struggle between the people and big business.

Altgeld, embracing free silver, joined the struggle. "Clevelandism," he said, "is the slimy offspring of that unhallowed marriage between Standard Oil and Wall Street." He would drive it from the Democratic Party. A first step was the calling of a special convention in Springfield to consider the currency question. Altgeld and silver emerged victorious. Silver conventions followed in other states, all of them emulating Illinois. When Altgeld arrived at the Democratic Convention of 1896 in Chicago, he, whom the Haymarket pardon had supposedly killed, was the most powerful man in his party.

What he did at Chicago was to return the Democracy from the house of Cleveland and Tilden to that of Jackson and Jefferson. The convention was his. He ruled it. He wrote the platform. He outmaneuvered the politicians—"those prudent, cautious, wise gentlemen who have to consult the tin roosters every morning to see what their convictions should be during the day." He read Grover Cleveland from the party. And had he been by birth an American, as assuredly he was in all his being, he might have received the nomination himself.

That honor was given to William Jennings Bryan, the Boy Orator of the Platte, who captured the delegates with an unforgettable speech: "Having behind us the producing masses of this nation

and of the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer . . . demands for a gold standard by saying . . . *You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!*"

Altgeld himself did not want to stand again. His health was gone, his personal fortune largely dissipated. Yet, caricatured as an anarchist, made the chief target of the campaign, he could not choose but run. Though grievously ill, he stumped hard for Bryan. At Cooper Union, where Lincoln had preceded him, he sat on the platform with Henry George and listened to the chant of the crowd: "We love you for the enemies you have made!"

But Cleveland helped sap Democratic strength by placing in the field a "goldbug" slate. Mark Hanna shook his barrel, crammed full with the biggest fund ever spent on an American election. William McKinley, Jr. was kept out of sight on his porch in Canton, Ohio. And the Democrats were beaten.

Denied by his successor the privilege of a farewell address, Altgeld left Springfield, an old man at forty-nine. Defeat did not close his public life. Though all his property was lost but a heavily mortgaged home, he continued to the end a crusader, battling monopoly as the law partner of Clarence Darrow. His last case was the defense, on March 11, 1902, of a hackmen's union against an injunction. That night he went to Joliet, to protest the Boer War. "Wrong," he said, "may seem to triumph. Right may seem to be defeated. But the gravitation of eternal justice is toward the throne of God. Any political institution which is to endure must be plumb with that line of justice." As he left the stage he was stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage. Early the next morning he died.

His could have been a wholly different story. For he was, in his beginnings, fired with the same ambition, gifted with the same financial acumen, as the robber barons whom he fought. His gradual perception that *The Cost of Something for Nothing*—as his last book was called—is "moral death" stemmed first from a desire to cleave to the right. He was, in high degree, the good man. His goodness, moreover, was informed with a critical intelligence, the absence of which would have made for but another savorless, if altruistic, millionaire. Intelligence and rectitude created the reformer. And the inevitability with which Altgeld came to that role makes of his biography a work of art. His life was a continual progress.

It is possible, amid the color and excitement that surround his tenure as governor, to lose sight of his solid achievement. Yet he has had few peers in the business of getting things done. The University of Illinois he helped to build from an insignificant college to

a ranking institution of higher learning. He forced through the first good behavior parole law in the Middle West, enacted a tax on inheritance, reformed the civil service. He successfully regulated the sweatshop and child labor. He brought factories under inspection, and limited to the eight-hour day their employment of women. Labor disputes were subjected to arbitration; employers were bridled, who for years had evaded taxation. He gave to Chicago its fine system of parks. And the poor of his state did literally come unto him.

He was indeed a reformer, but he was also a politician, and the reforms he inaugurated would never have been carried through had it not been for his political astuteness. He knew, if ardent liberals often do not, that the walls of Jericho are not really brought down by a trumpet, that Gideon's army is not summoned by rhetoric alone. And so like Lincoln before him and Franklin Roosevelt after, he mastered the art of politics, which is the art of the possible. August Spies on the scaffold may be more imposing a figure, but to Altgeld, the assiduous collector of statistics, the culler of votes, is owed a greater debt.

Not the least portion of his legacy is the clarity with which he examined an issue, the candor that marked his statement of it. To those who talked plausibly of "the lesser evil," who would oppose to the bogey of Republicanism a Democratic party only less conservative, only less mendacious, he replied, "It is the Clevelands, the men who put up respectable fronts, who are the real dangers." He would have no commerce with them, and if the struggle he precipitated helped temporarily to balk his party of a victory that would have been without substance, his vindication was the greater victory of Wilson's New Freedom, of Roosevelt's New Deal.

The grave dress of government—old clothes upon old sticks to scare a bird!—beguiled him not at all. Supreme Court judges wore black gowns, he suggested, "to impress the people with their infallibility. Now as these gowns are not very thick, and as some people might be able to see through them and be unpatriotic enough to question the justice of having to bear the burdens of government while the rich escape, and as there is danger that some of these men may doubt the infallibility of the court, would it not be well to have each judge wear two gowns for a while, until the storm blows over?"

But what most compels admiration for Altgeld is his passionate integrity. He lived in a gilded age when "the price-current of an honest man and patriot" jingled in the pockets of a Harriman or Hill; when for every Vanderbilt who would see the public damned, a dozen Conklings and Crokers arose to hurry the enterprise forward. There was another America: that of Thoreau, who knew that the perception and performance of right separates the diabolical

in man from the divine; of Garrison, who would not equivocate, nor excuse, nor retract, and who would be heard; of Phillips, to whom man was ever more valuable than money. From that America Altgeld derived. As a young and impecunious lawyer he ordered from his office a client whose case he found tainted. As the chief executive of his state he vetoed, in the teeth of unparalleled opposition, and the offer of a half-million dollar bribe, the Eternal Monopoly Bills of traction baron Charles T. Yerkes. When asked if it were good policy to issue the Haymarket pardon, he said, "It is right!"

He lives to posterity, then, because of his rectitude. For once to every generation comes a moment to decide, a time, in the phrase of the Wiseman, to speak. The hanging of John Brown in 1859, the execution of the Haymarket Martyrs, and that of Sacco and Vanzetti were such moments. Our time has had its moment, enjoining, not less than these others, a decision on all who have shared it. What is the price-current of an honest man and patriot today?

Altgeld must have pondered the question when, thinking to palliate his declaration of pardon, he asked the old liberal, Lyman Trumbull, to request it. And Trumbull, perhaps in fear of his lucrative law practice, refused. Altgeld stayed the course.

A LETTER FROM ANNE BRADEN

As most MR readers know, Carl Braden, Louisville newspaperman, was recently sentenced to 15 years in jail and a fine of \$5,000, allegedly for sedition but actually for the "crime" of helping a Negro buy a house in a white neighborhood. Latest developments in the case are set forth in the following letter from Anne Braden, Carl Braden's wife, which was received just as we were about to go to press. We take this opportunity to underline Mrs. Braden's appeal for financial assistance: we are convinced that there is no more important civil liberties case before the American courts today. Contributions should be sent to Anne Braden, P. O. Box 1302, Louisville, Kentucky.—THE EDITORS

In all the flurry of events here in Louisville, we have never had a chance to write to you and thank you for the fund appeal you ran in your editors' notes in the December issue, along with the brief account of the case in the article on desegregation in the South ["Southern Schools: Will Racism Be Erased?" by a Special Correspondent, MR, December 1954, pp. 279-283]. As a result of this, we have re-

ceived several contributions and letters from people who want to know more about the case. If you have the opportunity, you might remind your readers that we still urgently need money for the defense.

You undoubtedly have heard the outcome of the trial. They really dropped the hatchet on Carl, with a 15-year sentence and a \$5,000 fine. This was inevitable from the beginning, I suppose. We will, of course, appeal if we can possibly raise the necessary funds. I feel sure that sooner or later we will be able to expose this whole frame-up and bring to light the people who really blew up Wade's house. We hope it will be sooner rather than later.

The trial reminded me in a very literal sense of all I have ever heard of the original Salem witch hunts. All the pent-up hatred in the community, all the race prejudice, all the unreasoning fear of Communism seemed to come together and roll itself up into a little ball and fling itself at Carl. He became a symbol instead of a human being. The tension was relieved by a little humor, though, in the things that Carl had done which the prosecution quite seriously presented as seditious: for example, writing a letter opposing enactment of the McCarran Act, opposing UMT, advocating trade with Red China, and writing a story for Federated Press in 1949 saying there was unemployment in Louisville. All of these things, the prosecution assured the jury, were a serious threat to the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The most recent development is that the prosecution has backed down (as we were sure they would) from their announcement right after Carl's trial that they would next bring to trial the man actually charged with blowing up the Wade house. They have now announced that, instead, they will try me on February 28th on the sedition charge.

Obviously, they want to avoid coming to trial on the bombing charge because they know they have no case, will lose it, and in the course of doing so we may be able to show that they have known all along who really blew up the house. We are taking legal steps to demand that they try the bombing charge next and get to what one of our lawyers calls "the meat of the coconut." We are taking the position that we cannot get a fair trial in a free speech case with a phony bombing charge hanging over our heads and prejudicing the atmosphere.

Carl is still in jail at this point, as his appeal bond has been set at \$40,000. However, were he here, I am sure he would join me in sending New Year's greetings to you and MR, and in thanking you for your help.

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Uncle Sam's West Europe

Western Europe, in 1910, was the stable, solvent center of the earth's industrial, political, and military potential. Thirty-five years later, in 1945, Western Europe was a shambles. Germany, for example, was a country without a government, "without mail or telephone services; 754 sunken barges in the United States zone alone choked navigation on the Rhine; 885 railroad bridges dangled meaninglessly across spaceless voids; no one could count the broken highway bridges; its fields, in midsummer, were deserted; . . . in the American zone only 1200 factories out of 12,000 still worked." (Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, 1953, p. 140.) The Western Europe of 1945 had fallen from its 1910 power-pinnacle into a condition of impotence.

Where had the power gone?

Some of it had vanished. Some had passed to the Soviet Union or to the United States. The bulk of the industrial potential and the imperial authority lay unused, to be picked up by the first comer.

Three contenders for Western Europe's latent power elbowed one another during the summer of 1945. Britain aspired, but war exhaustion limited her ambitions. The Soviet Union, nursing her wounds, was preoccupied with the swift rush of revolution in Eastern Europe and Asia. The United States alone among the Great Powers had suffered little war damage, had been vastly enriched by the 1939-1945 ordeal, and was in a position to move easily and quickly into the European power vacuum.

At the outset of this power struggle, Washington set out to build a barrier that would exclude the Soviet Union from Western Europe as the "Cordon Sanitaire" of 1919 had excluded Bolshevism from Central Europe. Wartime lend-lease and UNRRA relief were followed by emergency aid to particular countries, such as Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. These stop-gap measures gave place to the more permanent Marshall Plan, and were followed by the establishment of formal military alliances, such as NATO and EDC-WEU, which gave Washington economic, political, and military responsibility for Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and their air and water approaches. The United States defense perimeter soon stretched from Turkey and Greece through Northern Italy and Central Europe to Iceland. Western Europe had become a sphere of United States influence to which Washington's armed forces extended their protec-

tion. But an uncompleted task remained—the United States must supplement military occupation by economic and political bonds which would subordinate Western Europe's economy to that of the United States and make Europe a useful tool in achieving the American Century goal of world hegemony.

Three formidable obstacles prevented the United States from securing a stranglehold on Western European power during the crucial post-war years. One was the Soviet Union, which made an unexpectedly quick recovery from the heavy damage suffered during the war. The second was a tidal wave of unrest and revolution which swept across Asia and parts of Africa, upsetting the long-established imperial economies of Britain, France, and Holland, and involving all three countries in expensive colonial wars. The third obstacle was the history and structure of Western Europe itself. Four centuries of commercial and industrial expansion had involved the chief European powers in a series of wars, with their aftermath of prejudice, hatred, and antagonism, symbolized by the sovereign pretensions and aspirations of heavily armed nations. Philip of Spain, Louis of France, Frederick of Prussia, and Napoleon had all made unsuccessful attempts to consolidate and unify Western Europe. Could Wall Street and Washington achieve European integration where these talented native sons had failed?

Another factor militated against State Department ambitions to make Washington the focal point for the determination of Western European policy. Wars of rivalry had seriously weakened all Western European power centers. Nothing short of federation would re-establish Western Europe as a major area in the world power struggle. Yet if economic and political integration went too far, the resulting strength might checkmate America's European ambitions. Western Europe must be strong enough to protect United States defense posts on the Rhine, but not strong enough to question United States ascendancy.

Washington Prods and Goads

United States State, Treasury, Commerce, Intelligence, and Defense Department representatives were net-worked across Western Europe between 1945 and 1954. United States naval units patrolled the sea approaches, while air units were based throughout Western Europe, North Africa, and the Near East. United States armed forces occupied Western Europe, while United States governmental aid and private investment poured billions into the shattered Western European economy. In effect, the United States had established itself as the dominant member of the Atlantic Community.

As senior partner in the venture to rehabilitate and re-empower

Western Europe, United States spokesmen made certain demands, such as the devaluation of currencies, an integrated Western European economy, huge rearmament budgets, a European Army led by a United States general. Finally, in this series of mandates, came the United States decision to reindustrialize and rearm Germany, the stubborn refusal to allow Peking to take its seat in the United Nations, and Washington's insistence during the spring and summer of 1954 upon taking over the Indo-China war and converting it into a war for the re-establishment of Western control over Southeast Asia.

After the defeat of the European Defense Community treaties by the French Assembly in the summer of 1954, and the refusal of the British and French to take part in an extension of the war in Southeast Asia, Washington came back smartly with the London and Paris Conferences which drew up the treaties for Western European Union which are being currently debated in various European capitals. The British might be obdurate and the French intractable, but the State Department proposed to have its way.

Secretary Dulles had warned Paris in December 1953 of a drastic reappraisal of United States foreign policy if France failed to toe the mark. In January 1954, Dulles made it clear that Washington was insisting on German rearmament. "Western Europe cannot be successfully defended without a defense of West Germany. West Germany cannot be defended without help from the Germans. German help is forbidden by the armistice arrangements still in force. The West German Republic needs to be freed from the armistice." (Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954.)

Such reasoning made the liberation and rearmament of Germany the keystone of Washington's Western European policy. Throughout 1954, the political battle had been joined along those lines, with Britain supporting the United States reluctantly and France repeatedly declining to cooperate.

Within the generation represented by Churchill and Adenauer, Western Europe, the solvent, sovereign master of its own destiny and arbiter in the world wealth-power struggle, had been reduced to such utter dependence upon United States decisions that policies made in Washington could be implemented by United States officials and armed forces scattered strategically across Western Europe. If Acheson and Dulles demanded German rearmament, who were the Western Europeans to question, let alone to resist State Department directives?

Debate on German Rearmament

Uncle Sam's domination of Western Europe has found one of its most decisive expressions in Washington's determination to rein-

dustrialize and rearm West Germany. Had it not been for Washington's stand, the question of German rearmament would have been left in abeyance by the common consent of Western Europeans.

Misgivings on the subject of German rearmament are widespread in France, Britain, Belgium, Holland. Twice since 1914, German military forces have occupied France and Belgium. Twice they have rained destruction and death upon the British Isles, their merchant fleets, and their sources of food and raw materials. Within the past half century, Western Europe has suffered more war damage from Germany than from any other power.

Misgivings concerning German rearmament also are widespread in Germany itself. The German Socialists, the largest single political party in West Germany, oppose rearmament. So do the Communists, the pacifists, and other peace groups. The German people, who have suffered severely during two wars in one generation, are against any move that points toward a new military struggle with Germany as battlefield. Again, a rearmed West Germany will mean a rearmed East Germany, with Germans on both sides, prepared and equipped to exterminate fellow Germans.

The Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania have also been twice invaded and occupied by German forces during the present generation. Losses in the Soviet Union and Poland were particularly heavy. These five countries have a double reason for opposing German rearmament: (1) the historical reason of recent German aggression; (2) the persistent efforts of Washington to encircle Eastern Europe militarily, and Washington's insistence upon a rearmed Germany as the key to another military drive against Communism in Europe.

Soviet, British, and United States representatives signed the Potsdam Agreement in 1945, providing for German disarmament. Soviet diplomacy met the State Department proposals of 1950 for German rearmament with the direct statement that the Soviet Union could not permit the restoration of an armed Germany. During the ensuing development of NATO and EDC, Moscow adhered steadfastly to this line. In December 1954, when Washington was pushing its hardest for the ratification of the Western European Union treaties providing for a rearmed Germany, Russian spokesmen protested vigorously in the United Nations, and the Soviet Foreign Office notified France and Britain that a ratification of the WEU treaties would abrogate the Paris-Moscow friendship Treaty of 1944 and the London-Moscow Treaty of 1942.

Every Western European country, with the exception of Spain, had serious misgivings on the subject of German rearmament. The West Germans themselves questioned it. The French National As-

sembly finally approved the WEU treaties by a narrow margin on December 30, 1954, only after Washington and London spokesmen had said in so many words that Germany was to be rearmed in any case, with or without French approval. The WEU treaties will be adopted solely as a result of Washington's insistence and against the considered opinions of Western European statesmanship and worldwide popular opposition. Once again, as in the case of the Japanese Treaty of 1951 and the recent United States-Spanish military alliance, Secretary Dulles will have his way. But the victory will be largely on paper. The Western Europeans who signed on the dotted line for German rearmament, because they had no alternative except to line up with the Soviet Union, will express their sense of frustration and resentment at the first opportunity.

Billions for Atoms

Meanwhile a new issue, broader and deeper than German rearmament, had taken the center of the world stage—the question of atomic warfare. Since the fateful day in August, 1945, when a United States atom bomb vaporized large areas of Hiroshima, people throughout the civilized world had faced a new source of insecurity—atomic fission and fusion.

Having proved by the experiments on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and by subsequent tests in the southwest desert and in the Far Pacific, the extreme destructivity of the uranium weapon, Washington spent billions in making and stockpiling atom bombs, and built its defense strategy upon its monopoly of the new destructives.

When Moscow began testing uranium bombs, Washington turned its scientific and engineering skills to the design and production of a far more terrible destructive weapon, the hydrogen bomb, which was also produced, tested, and stockpiled.

During this race of the two major world powers to step up destructivity to greater and greater intensities, there was much public discussion centering around the argument that atomic weapons would not be used in a new war, because they were too terrible. Top military leaders like Britain's Marshal Montgomery, in answer to direct questions, said that in a war, to gain victory, the armed forces will use whatever means they have at their command. Britain's Air Marshal Sir John Slessor wrote in a recently published article that "the weapon of mass destruction would certainly be used in any great war between major Powers." (*U.S. News & World Report*, December 31, 1954, pp. 60-61.)

The argument regarding the use of atomic weapons in another general war was settled, as far as it could be in advance of the event,

by a Paris meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 17, 1954. The official summary of Council proceedings called attention to ever increasing Soviet military power and the resulting threat to "the free world." In the face of this threat, German rearmament is "an indispensable addition to the defense effort of the West."

Another basis for Western defences, the summary stated, lies in atomic weapons. On this issue the Council statement was cautious and evasive: "the Council considered a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength over the next few years, taking into account modern developments in weapons and techniques. It approved this report as a basis for defense planning . . . noting that this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities."

The *New York Times* in its news summary on December 19 translated this double talk as follows: the Council "formally accepted a defense concept which NATO's military commanders have long urged—reliance on atomic weapons as the bulwark of Western strength."

Secretary Dulles, in a Washington press conference on December 21, went even further and advocated the use of atomic weapons to meet "aggression." The Secretary told his interviewers that while Western defense would be based on atomic weapons, there had been no NATO decision, as yet, as to the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be used.

Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert for the *New York Times*, continuing the argument in two articles on December 19 and 21, pointed out that since United States military commanders, scattered widely across Western Europe and its approaches, now have atomic weapons "of an almost incredible number, power, and complexity"—he named and described various weapons in his December 19 article—when hostilities begin it will be possible for anyone of a large number of regional officers to commit the world to an all-out atomic war by taking matters into their own hands and using the first atomic weapon.

Western Europe at the Crossroads

The rearmament of Germany will take the world one step nearer war. President Eisenhower said as much in his January 6, 1955, message on the State of the Union.

Another general war will be fought with nuclear weapons.

One of the chief battlefields in such a war will be Western Europe.

Western Europeans, dreading such a catastrophe, have striven

to modify State Department policy and deflect it away from war toward peaceful coexistence. Their failure in this attempt brings them face to face with a fateful decision:

Continue with the United States in a nuclear war and accept the consequent devastation; *or*

Throw in their lot with Eastern Europe and a resurgent Asia, and use atomic energy to provide abundance and promote social well-being.

THE SWEETZY CASE ABROAD

BY LEO HUBERMAN

In its issue of last August, the excellent New Zealand left-wing monthly *Here & Now* ran a short piece on the Sweetzy case by its Washington correspondent, who concluded: "Here is a clear-cut case that will echo in Europe and Asia, where Sweetzy's theoretical writings are well known."

The prediction has proved to be well founded. Because we believe that MR readers will be interested in the details, and also for the record, we present the following round-up of foreign reactions to the Sweetzy case up to the time of writing.

Japan

The case has aroused far more interest and concern in Japan than anywhere else, including the United States. It would be interesting to try to analyze the reasons for this, but here we can only note that it is obviously closely related to the fact that both MR itself and the works of MR's editors (seven of which have been translated into Japanese) have been widely circulated and read in Japan in the period since World War II.

First, it should be noted that Sweetzy was sentenced to jail just as the Japanese edition of *The Present As History* was about to go to press. Professor Shigeto Tsuru, of Tokyo's Hitotsubashi University and one of Japan's leading economists, supervised the translation of the book and took the occasion to add a translator's note which reads as follows:

Since Paul Sweetzy spoke of me in his Preface to the Japa-

nese edition, I would like to report a little about his present life. On June 30, 1954, Paul Sweezy was found in contempt of court and sentenced to jail. [Here follows a brief account of the facts of the case.] The United States, which has been so proud of its Bill of Rights, has committed this cruel action against the author of this book. Hearing this news, I became angry. The deeper Sweezy delves into the historical course which the United States is now pursuing, the harder the American ruling class tries to suppress his activities. Nothing could show more convincingly than this how the United States is now working against the movement of world history. In company with others who love true freedom, I wish to give eager support to Sweezy, and to protest against this American anti-democratic action.

As a consequence, the case has been widely commented upon in connection with reviews of the book. Among the newspapers and magazines which have carried material bearing on the case—in every instance condemning the action of the New Hampshire authorities—the following have been brought to our notice: the weekly newspaper of the General Conference of Japan Labor Unions (Japan's largest labor federation with about three million members); the weekly "Hitotsubashi University Press"; the monthly "Historical Review"; the weekly "Readers' Guide"; "International Economic Outlook," which ran a translation of Professor H. H. Wilson's editorial article in *The Nation* of September 4th; "Asahi Weekly," Japan's nearest equivalent to the Sunday edition of the *New York Times*, with a circulation of over half a million. "Pioneer," monthly organ of the Japanese YMCA, is planning to publish a full account of the case in a special February issue devoted to academic freedom, and *Sekai*, a magazine with a very large circulation among intellectuals, is planning to review the case from the legal point of view. This list of publications is to be taken as representative rather than exhaustive, since we receive new reports adding to it nearly every week.

Second, we understand that the General Conference of Japan Labor Unions either has protested, or is planning to protest, the case to the American Embassy in Tokyo. Needless to say, it affords special satisfaction to us as American intellectuals to receive this kind of solidarity and support from one of the great labor federations of the capitalist world.

Third, the Conference of Japanese Intellectuals, a very large and comprehensive organization, unanimously adopted a resolution protesting the case at its annual meeting in Tokyo on December 4th.

Fourth, a brief "Statement" of protest has been circulated among university professors, especially in the economics and other social science departments, and so far the names of well over a hundred

signatories, including some of the best known and most widely respected in the country, have been sent to us. In token of thanks and by way of greeting to our Japanese friends and colleagues, we print this list in a footnote below (the order of the signatories is simply the order in which they signed the statement).*

Finally, there have been a considerable number of meetings and resolutions by small groups (especially student unions at various universities), and we have received communications of encouragement and support from many individuals and organizations.

In conclusion, it seems safe to say that the reaction to the Sweezy case in Japan reflects both a vigorous and growing democratic movement in that country and a deep concern with what is happening in the United States.

France

In the West, there has been more concern about the case in France than elsewhere. The independent socialist weekly, *France-Observateur*, was one of the first press organs anywhere to comment on the case editorially (August 19). Part of the text of the editorial follows:

Among the convictions for the crime of "non-conformism" which have been registered in the course of the last few weeks in the United States, that which concerns Paul Sweezy especially deserves our attention. . . .

* Fumiichi Kodan, Ikuo Akimoto, Hiroshi Iwao, Sadayuki Sato, Kanichi Iida, Tetsuzo Teramura, Akira Futami, Yuzo Sugai, Takeo Saito, Toichi Nawa, Kiyoshi Matsui, Seiryu Hata, Osamu Abe, Teruyoshi Kaji, Itaru Irie, Kenzo Yukizawa, Kenji Katayama, Satoshi Watanabe, Hisao Onoe, Kenzo Henmi, Hachiro Fukasawa, S. Marumo, K. Saito, Toshiro Sugimoto, Misao Ohye, Tokutaro Yagyu, Fumimaru Yamoto, Kazuo Kanamaru, Izumo Sugimoto, Hikoji Katano, Michio Yoshida, Isao Hibino, Takuo Kitabayashi, Yasuo Noritake, Kojiro Niino, Minoru Oka, Susumu Kaido, Yoshizo Yoshida, Takasuke Suenaga, T. Kawashima, Shigeji Matuura, H. Ogura, Chojiro Sakabe, Nobuo Minobe, E. Ikukawa, K. Ogawa, K. Shibayama, Y. Hirata, Kentaro Hiraoka, Kinji Nakamura, Hiroshi Mizuta, Takeshi Kawaziri, Ichiro Kawai, Y. Shibaike, Hikotake Osako, Shigetsugu Okumura, Susumu Yoshinobu, Tadao Horie, Toshio Kikuchi, Rokuro Tsuchiya, Kisuke Tanaka, Isokichi Nishikawa, Takao Kuroda, Hiroshi Kitamura, Kazuo Nonomura, Shochiro Koono, Minoru Miyagawa, Yoshio Miyake, Kiyoki Yoneda, Tomizo Ujita, Seihei Shinada, Kiyoshi Miyakawa, R. Shikida, N. Tsuchiya, Akira Kondo, Seiichi Kato, Hiroshi Nomura, Takashi Noguchi, Keiichi Ito, Morio Nakajima, Ichiro Oshima, Shichiro Totsako, Hiromiti Ishizuka, Mikitoshi Gakenshi, Satoru Konishi, Yoshihiro Eto, Michio Shibata, Tadako Fukuda, Yoke Yoshida, Ryoko Fukuda, Sakiko Yamada, Sahei Watanabe, Takeo Suzuki, Takee Serizawa, T. Fujitsuka, Shinichi Sato, S. Kurazono, Mitsuo Kuyama, Mizuo Otani, Makoto Hatano, Y. Okiyama, Shigeo Oka, Tatsuo Ozawa, Tomoo Matsuda, Yasutaro Owaku, Kenji Tajima, Eiichi Kudo, Eiichi Hosaka.

He was subjected to the procedure of "investigation" and asked to answer questions about his opinions, his activities, and those of a certain number of persons and organizations (particularly the Progressive Party). Paul Sweezy reaffirmed his socialist convictions, but for the rest refused to answer. One of his friends, Professor Daggett, who was subjected to the same treatment, adopted a similar position.

We have nothing to hide, they said. We have always expressed our views openly and have participated in no subversive activities. But it is our opinion that one cannot, without putting in question the very principles of democracy, *force* Americans to answer questions bearing on their ideas, their political life, and their professional activities and on the ideas, political lives, and professional activities of their fellow citizens.

The judge immediately sentenced Paul Sweezy to prison. He is appealing but had to put up bail of \$1,000.

This decision cannot but provoke indignation among all who, while not necessarily sharing the opinions of Mr. Sweezy, nevertheless admire his talent and appreciate his honesty and moral courage.

One other French editorial comment seems worth quoting at some length. It comes from the October issue of *Esprit*, which is often described as a left-wing Catholic publication from the fact that many of its contributors, including some of the most brilliant, are both radicals and Catholics. Under the title "On the Relativity of Judgment," Professor Henri Bartoli writes as follows:

French economists have not learned without anger that Professor P. M. Sweezy has just been sentenced (on June 30th) to prison for refusing to answer questions put to him by a commission of inquiry operating in the state of New Hampshire. The sentence implies that our colleague will remain in prison as long as he maintains his refusal to answer. The application of the penalty has been suspended, over the objection of the Attorney General, and bail set at \$1,000. . . .

French economists have not left their American colleague without testimonials. . . . They have nothing but contempt for denunciatory proceedings and violations of conscience so foreign to the traditions of a country which has so often in the past been one of the pillars of the camp of liberty. Since when do they condemn a man on the other side of the Atlantic because he wishes to defend freedom of opinion and expression?

What's more, the American judges are very poorly informed. If they read the Soviet reviews, they would know that in *Economic Questions* [Voprosy Ekonomiki], No. 9, 1952, our colleague was the object of a whole series of extremely violent accusations. Consider the following:

"The apologetics for the armament race and war appear probably in the most shameless form in the works of P. Sweezy, an American bourgeois economist who in the past used to parade a 'leftist' phraseology. . . . The apologetics for militarism in the article of Sweezy truly knows no limit. . . . Needless to say, the thesis advanced by Sweezy concerning the 'abolition' in our time of contradictions among imperialist states represents a crude falsification of facts. In his servility to the monopolies of Wall Street, Sweezy brazenly denies the drive of American capitalism towards world domination. . . ." etc.

Our time has little use for men who stand up on their own feet [*les hommes debout*]. Condemned in his own country, insulted by an imbecile in the USSR, P. M. Sweezy is a witness to the fact.

French reaction to the case has not been confined to editorial comment. A "Petition," expressing concern and hope that the action against Sweezy would be reversed in the higher courts, has been signed by 32 social scientists, including some of the most famous in France. The list of signatories follows: H. Bartoli, C. Bettelheim, H. Denis, J. Domarchi, J. Dresch, J. Fourastié, P. Fraisse, G. Friedmann, P. George, G. T. Guilbaud, H. Guitton, G. Gurvitch, E. Labrousse, G. Lasserre, H. Levy-Bruhl, G. Lyon-Caen, Y. Mainguy, J. Marczewski, J. Mayer, R. Mercier, J. Meynaud, A. Nataf, H. Noyelle, A. Piatier, A. Piganiol, A. Piettre, V. Rouquet-la-Garrigue, F. Sellier, P. Vilar, A. Sauvy, J. Soustelle, and J. Tricart.

This list contains persons of widely varying political beliefs, not only left-wingers. For example, Fourastié, Noyelle, Piatier, Piganiol, and Piettre are well-known conservatives in the tradition of French academic economics. Gurvitch, Labrousse, and Levy-Bruhl are right-wing Socialists. And Jacques Soustelle is best known as one of the leading parliamentary spokesmen of Gaullism.

This distinguished group sent copies of the "Petition" to the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune* with a covering letter requesting that it be published in their letter columns. Both papers ignored the request. They also sent a copy to the American Embassy in Paris and received in reply two polite notes from United States Ambassador Douglas Dillon. The second of these notes shows that inquiries were made about the case from the State Department in Washington.

Great Britain

The first press notice concerning the Sweezy case, outside the New Hampshire and Boston newspapers, was in the London *New Statesman & Nation*, and it is an interesting comment on the situation

in the United States today that many Americans learned about the case first from the *New Statesman*, which has a circulation of several thousand in this country.

We have been informed that a statement concerning the case has been drafted and is being circulated for signatures among faculty members at Cambridge, Oxford, and the London School of Economics. At the time of writing, however, we are unable to give further particulars concerning this move.

Latin America

A number of Chilean economists, who under present conditions in that country must remain anonymous, took the initiative last fall in making the facts of the case known in Latin America. I quote from a letter from one of them, under date of October 6:

I am sending you a copy of a translation to Spanish of the case Daggett-Sweezy [Leo Huberman's article in the August issue of MR]. This copy has been distributed among all the students, economists, and many other people. The case is now relatively known, and I must say that it has found a wide support in every person. Unfortunately, the country [Chile] is now under "Estado de Sitio" [state of siege, similar to martial law], a very difficult situation for expressing openly ideas and to sign a manifesto. Anyway we are doing everything we can to get a declaration at least among writers, progressive politicians, and university professors, who are the advanced people here. Economists are among the most reactionary people, except in a few cases. Once the manifesto is signed, I will send you a copy of the newspapers in which we hope to publish it. I must also say that a committee has already been formed among the students of the School of Economy, and this committee is sending copies of the case to all Latin American schools of economy.

Meanwhile, I hope that the good sense will return to certain Americans. They are doing the utmost to discredit everything that comes from the U.S.

At the time of writing, we have no further word regarding these various actions in Latin America.

In conclusion, I should like to add that this round-up is certainly not exhaustive, and any MR readers, either in this country or abroad, who can add further material are invited to do so. If further developments warrant, we shall report again in a later issue.

We do not protect freedom in order to indulge error. We protect freedom in order to discover truth.

—Henry Steele Commager, *Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent*

(continued from inside front cover)

years is being considered. Perhaps even more ominous, a bill establishing 14 criteria of membership in a proscribed subversive organization (presumably the same criteria contained in the federal Communist Control Law) has been introduced and seems likely to be acted upon favorably. These are the criteria under which the *Wall Street Journal* said that it could be found to be a Communist newspaper.

We have watched with interest and sympathy the development during its first year of existence of *The American Socialist*, a monthly magazine which, as its title indicates, is dedicated to the cause of socialism in the United States. At first, we must confess, we were somewhat skeptical as to whether *The American Socialist* could transcend the arid tradition of sectarianism which has had so baneful an influence on the American Left (the editors had just recently broken away from the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party). In this respect, however, the magazine has been a pleasant surprise. Sectarian squabbles have been absent from its pages, and it has been well edited and written in simple, straightforward language, not in jargon. In a sense, of course, *The American Socialist* is a rival of MR, and we welcome it as such: the more rivals we have the better we like it. But in another sense, the two magazines supplement each other. We have more theoretical articles than they do; their coverage of labor is more thorough than ours; and their book review section fills a need which we have long recognized but lack the space to attempt to meet. We commend *The American Socialist* to the attention of MR readers. If you would like a free sample copy, drop them a note to 863 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y.

Science & Society has published a booklet entitled *Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*, edited by Maurice Dobb and containing articles which have appeared in S&S by Dobb, Paul Sweezy, and others. The booklet sells for \$1 a copy and can be obtained directly from S&S, 30 East 20th Street, New York 3, N. Y.

The other day we got a letter on the stationery of the Dean of a School of Business Administration, and you will, we feel sure, share the surprise and pleasure we experienced when we read: "I have been a subscriber since the first issue of the *Review* and plan to continue my subscription as long as it is published. I would not be without it. The insights and information I gain from your magazine are invaluable to me in my classroom and community activities. As a matter of fact, I do everything that I can to spread the influence of the *Review* in my community." If a Dean of Business Administration can do it, why can't you?

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